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Spotlighting the State: Political literature in Indonesia
Indonesia occupies a special place in Southeast Asian studies 
literatures not only because it is the largest plural society and most 
populous nation in this region, but also because of the political dynamics 
of transition from the authoritarian regime to democratisation. Since the 
reformasi (reformation) which commenced by1998, Indonesian politics 
has entered a new phase of democratisation characterized in particular 
by the policies of decentralisation. This has fostered greater autonomy in 
governing political and fi nancial affairs at the provincial and especially at 
the regency/district levels. 
The New Order state model gained the attention of academics, 
especially political scientists, historians and anthropologists. Over the 
years the focus on the state was somewhat reversed, especially after the 
dismantling of the Suharto regime, but it remains strong. In general, the 
scholarly approaches to the study of Indonesian politics in the wide sense 
of the term either focus on the state institutions or civil society politics. 
The fi rst type of analysis emphasises the ways in which state 
subjugate most elements of society structurally, including the political 
economy. For these scholars, the state produces the socio political 
dynamics and the state becames the source of changes at the societal level. 
This is usually referred to as top down political changes or what Liddle 
(1973) calls as ‘evolution from above’. 
The state-centred analysis has produced knowledge on elite 
behavior in economy and politics, and on the role of state institutions in 
maintaining social and political order. This type of analysis tends to focus 
on the centre and the elites, setting aside common people in local contexts. 
Consequently, their analyses of the relationship between state and society 
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in Indonesia has located the state as an instrumental political entity. This 
in turn constructs our general knowledge of state and politics at large 
(Mundayat 2005:5). 
Two of the pioneering projects on Indonesia that applied this type of 
approach were those of George Mc T Kahin (1952) and Herbert Feith (1962), 
working on the development of nationalism, the emergence of political 
parties, the establishment of legislative bodies and the state in general. 
Their studies induced many related research programs on Indonesia in 
the following decades. The new generation of academics then developed 
more refi ned models of analysis of the New Order state. Leading analysts 
included Karl Jackson (1978), with his ‘bureaucratic polity’ model; Harold 
Crouch (1979) characterising the New Order state as a ‘neopatrimonial 
regime’ that could not be combined with democracy; Herbert Feith (1980) 
again now emphasising the ‘repressive developmentalist’ aspects of the 
state; and Ruth McVey (1982), drawing attention to the historical colonial 
roots of the bureaucratic state in terms of ‘beamtenstaat’. 
In the 1980s, there was an important shift towards more structural 
and political economy oriented approaches. Richard Robison acknowledged 
the importance of capitalism in transforming Indonesian society and thus 
focused his study on the interaction of culture, economics, and political 
factors in understanding the foundations of the New Order regime (Robison 
1981).
Robison (1981) and Hadiz’ (1997) showed the importance of class 
struggle of workers in industrial areas that would contribute to political 
change as they organised themselves into trade unions. Meanwhile 
Törnquist (1982 and 1984)  stressed the importance of primitive (coercive 
and politically organised) accumulation of capital and concluded thus that 
the related class confl icts could spur demands for democratisation.
In spite of the wider focus however, these analysts maintained 
that the state-society interaction is primarily framed structurally (Robison 
1986, Robison & Hadiz 2004). Although in their recent publication (Robison 
& Hadiz 2004) Hadiz emphasises the role of politico-business oligarchic 
actors, his approach still views these actors as the actual masters of the 
political and economic life of the state and as structurally determined.
Moreover, all these types of approaches have actually contributed 
to the understanding that the state is too powerful and needs to be 
downsized through liberal markets and democracy. At this point however, 
the structuralists like Robison and Hadiz stressing the political economy 
were lost some on their infl uence in favour of institutionalism. Studies of 
power and democracy in Indonesia since the 1990s has mainly focused 
on the state institutions of democracy or state bodies (such as courts, 
legislatures, bureaucracies, and electoral system) and state enforced rules 
(constitutions, laws, and regulations). This focus on state institutions has 
had a systematic effect on political outcomes, such as the political reforms 
from 1998 until the early 2000s that promoted the formal core institutions 
of a procedural democracy. It is true that the analysts having emphasised 
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that democratisation and institutional change was rooted in class 
confl ict over coercive capitalism stressed the potential of not just citizen 
associations but also class based organisations e.g. Törnquist 1989, 1991 
), but the mainstream argument was rather of liberal civil society driven 
democratisation of state institutions, which in turn would get democracy 
on track (later on analysed by e.g. Aspinall 2005).
The latter argument was related to the arguments by researchers 
of Latin America such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). They argue that 
all transitions toward democracy in 1970s and 80s Latin America began 
with a split in the regime, especially between hard-liners and soft-liners. 
This then followed by intensifi ed mobilisation by democratic civil society 
and opposition forces which then pushed toward democratic transition 
through negotiation process. O’Donnell  (1994 ) suggests for instance that 
the spotlight on the state institutions of democracy has been insuffi cient 
and elitist in nature. It has prevented a fi rm understanding of the role of civil 
society. Moreover, formal liberal-democratic institutions have dominated 
most of the public arenas and narrowed down all possible alternative and/
or additional representation fostered  from below. 
O’Donnell’s (1994) “delegative democracy” work on Latin American 
democracies argues that many of the formal rules of representative 
democracy are weak. In this case he notes the effect of clientelism and other 
forms of particularism in undermining the effectiveness of representative 
institutions. This same argument of O’ Donnell’s can be found in the 
discussion about Indonesia’s liberal oriented electoral democracy. For 
example, an extensive study was made of the post-Soeharto democracy 
movements (Prasetyo et.al 2003) and Törnquist (2004), based on Indonesia’s 
fi rst national democracy survey (later reported in Priyono et.al 2007). These 
studies speak of a ‘democratic defi cit’. The meaning of this defi cit is that 
the quality of a number of formal institutions related to governance and 
especially representation is very poor. In addition, the ordinary citizens do 
not have the ability to improve and make full use of the new institutions. 
This creates weaknesses in vertical accountability/representation and in 
constitutional and legal checks and balances (patronage, corruption, and 
weak oppositional parties). 
A related but more sociological and anthropological approach to 
the study of power and democracy can be found in studies that focus on 
the societal level of political life. In this category we may include classical 
perspectives such as those of McVey (1965, 1978,1992,) and Benedict 
Anderson (1972a, 1972b, 1982, 1983) which differ from the polity oriented 
analyses in that they draw attention to the importance of broader studies 
of the Indonesian society to understand political life. 
The signifi cance of these studies lies in the role of civil society 
that encompasses civic, religious, kinship, and other “societal” rules and 
organisations. The studies of civil society institutions have long been a 
central object of study in the fi eld of anthropology and Indonesian local 
politics(i.e. Antlov 1995). The prominent fi gure established the base body 
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of knowledge of Indonesian studies at the everyday life level was Clifford 
Geertz. His important early work investigated the relations between 
the state and parties and the ethnic, religious, and cultural aspects of 
postcolonial Indonesia at the societal level rather than state level (Geertz 
1960, 1963). 
This kind of study has become important in Indonesia since the 
1980s. For example, John Sulivan’s (1992) study on urban kampong 
political life and Hans Antlov (1995) work on village politics show the role 
of the state in people’s lives at the local level. However, even though their 
work at the local level focuses their attention on society, their studies 
remain infl uenced by the discourse that the state plays a dominant role at 
the local level. 
These diffi culties of moving away from state centrism have 
meant that the study of civil society institutions has not been rigorously 
conceptualised or theorised in Indonesian politics. Consequently, the civil 
society studies remain at the margins of the contemporary literature on 
political institutions of Indonesia. 
Besides being under-theorised in the Indonesian context, civil 
society institutions of politics face problems from their counterparts, 
i.e. state institutions,the market and the associational life which is not 
based on citizenship rights such as groups based on religious and ethnic 
identities. The inequality of power relations (such as of of wealth, access, 
control, and infl uence) between, on the one hand, state as well as other 
dominant institution such as religious organisations and ethnic based 
communities (komunitas adat) which function as local equivalents of state 
organisations, and, on the other hand,civil society has produced problems 
for the process of democracy. This political inequality has several impacts, 
such as the lack of democratic governance, which infl uences the political 
behavior of elite and civil society, and undermines deliberative aspects of 
democracy. Civil society groups do not have the ability or the willingness 
to express their own reasons publicly and to consider the public reasons 
of others. Thus, the question of this study is therefore how it would be 
possible, in-spite of the uphill constraints, to bring those institutions 
into a productive synergy, to thus foster what we shall call ‘democratic 
governmentality’. 
Mapping the Post-Reformasi Literature 
on State and Civil Society Relations 
This section maps and analyses the literature on state and civil 
society relationships. To gain an understanding of the relationship between 
state and civil society from the literature on the Indonesian context, we 
need to defi ne civil society theoretically.  
Agnes S. Ku notes that civil society in classical concept is not 
yet understood as a sphere of life distinct from the state. Rather as in 
79
PCD Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2
Locke’s liberalism, civil society is associated with political society and in 
opposition to the state. In further development of capitalism, there was 
a need to prevent state despotism by fostering self organisation within 
society. Hence it was argued that the state had to be restricted to protect 
citizen’s life, liberty and property. Hegel envisages that civil society is a 
sphere where individuals with self interest enter into interdependent 
social relationships with one another, without sharing their optimism and 
inherently overwhelmed with egoism and confl ict (Ku:2002). For Marx 
who worked within the framework of distinguishing between base and 
superstructure, the bourgeois civil society is understood to be rooted in the 
economic relations that operates under the logic of exploitative capitalism. 
Hence both liberal and Marxist traditions tend to relate civil society to the 
dynamics of the market economy. Gramsci (1971), however, stressed the 
importance of non economic forces in social life. He distinguished between 
state and civil society as two non economic modes of domination. While 
the state is an institution of political coercion for the dominant classes; 
civil society is the domain of cultural and ideological practices generating 
consent with the state governance. 
Without negating these perspectives, we would argue however 
that they are  inadequate to understand the complexity of civil society in 
the contemporary forms of capitalism in post-colonial contexts such as 
Indonesia. Rather we think that the defi nitions of civil society provided 
by Parson (1971: 24, 92-98) and Habermas’ (1989 and 1996) are more 
fruitful. Their defi nitions are based on the distinction between three 
types of ‘operative social organisations’ consisting of money organised 
through the market, power working through administrative organisations, 
and infl uence that works through associations. These operative social 
organisations are mediated by communication which then constitutes a 
public sphere where these entities are interconnecting, infl uencing and 
mediating each other. Further more, according to Chandhoke, normatively, 
civil society represents an important stage in the transition from the 
family to the state. It is a space characterized by an explicit principle of 
particularistic individualism and implicit principle of communitarianism 
(Chandhoke, 1995). Then when they involve in the political project of civil 
participation are actually self limiting because their aim is not to capture 
the state but to expand the sphere of self organized out side the state 
(Chandhoke, 1995:30)
Civil society in European political context as Parson and Habermas 
argue is actually a social space because the members of this associative 
relations develop it for active communication and building up linkages for 
scaling up their interests. The space here is the domain for agencies to 
participate in and to contest, produce, reproduce and disseminate their 
ideas in relation to the state and market. The participants in this associative 
relation can be active or passive. This situation seems diffi cult to fi nd it in 
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post colonial state of Indonesia. Due to this I will use the concept of civil 
society as what Chandhoke(1995) argues before. The closest argument to 
support Chandhoke is as what Partha Chaterjee (2001) argues that: 
“Most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even 
then ambiguously and contextually, right-bearing citizens…
They are not, therefore proper members of civil society and are 
not regarded as such by the institutions of the state.
Following the condition of post colonial state as what Chaterjee 
explains, civil society in Indonesia remain debatable. Hence there are 
two possible characters of civil society – a strong civil society and a weak 
civil society. The civil society is strong when the space for associational 
relations enables the participants to develop equal political relationship 
with the state or market. Conversely, civil society is weak when it is unable 
to develop equal political relationships with the state or market.
This article will analyse the existing literature on the relationship 
between civil society and the state rather than the market. This is because 
we are discussing these issues within the context of what we shall soon 
defi ne as governmentality. Assuming that civil society is an associational 
relation and the state is an administrative organisation, both of them are 
institutions in terms of formal and informal rules and regulations. Given 
that the relationship between state and civil society involves what we have 
called agencies, one needs to consider the relationship from the point of 
view of the actors and do away with assumptions of the state and civil 
society as self contained solid entities. Therefore, this study frames the 
state as part of everyday life practices, discursive and ideational. In this 
context, the state is not only a question of organised institutions, but 
also the ideas of managing and encountering government and agencies 
(Corbridge et.al 2005:5). 
By employing this defi nition, the state can be understood more 
as ideational or as a form of governmentality. The term ‘governmentality’ 
itself was fi rst used by Michel Foucault. He defi nes ‘governmentality as the 
study of the “autonomous” individual’s capacity for self control and how 
this is linked to forms of political rule.’ (Foucault 1994: 221). The term 
of governmentality used to describe the way of administering populations 
such as through census and registration. This technique rise within the 
context of the emergence of the idea of the state in modern European 
history. This is not at the level of administrative or political practice but 
rather the techniques and procedures which are design to govern the 
conduct of both individuals and population. 
The concept of governmentality helps us thus to understand the 
critical character of government. This in turn enables us to also take 
into account the confl icts and resistance that are put forward against 
technologies and rationalities of government. In accordance with this 
understanding, the relationship between state and civil society might take 
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the form of different relations of power such as confl ict, anarchy, clientelism 
and engagement. The form of power relations between civil society and the 
state in the Indonesian context can be mapped as in the matrix below.
Figure 1. The Forms of Power Relations Between Civil Society and the State
CHARACTERS
INEFFECTIVE STATE
TACTICS OF
GOVERNMENTALITY
EFFECTIVE STATE
TACTICS OF
GOVERNMENTALITY
STRONG CIVIL
SOCIETY
(1)Alternative/
resistance/ confl ict
(Alternative governmentality)
(4) Engagement
(Democratic
governmentality)
WEAK CIVIL
SOCIETY
(2)Thuggery/
Militia/Paramilitary
 (Extralegal governmentality)
(3)Money politics,
patronage, clientelism,
cooptation
(Patronage governmentality)
The relationships between state and civil society in the matrix 
above, illustrate that we should consider whether governmentality is 
effective or ineffective. The effective state tactics of governmentality show 
that the power operates effectively through the process of government. 
This needs discipline from the state apparatus in implementing the state’s 
programs. The state may also incorporate civil society as a participant in 
it. On the other side, ineffective state tactics of governmentality show the 
opposite characteristics. 
One can differentiate between strong and weak civil society. First, 
strong civil society is the situation where the citizens and non-citizens are 
active and have capacity to organise to defend their interests politically and 
mobilise themselves for struggle to defend their interests. Second, a weak 
civil society is in the opposite situation. The citizens and non-citizens  are 
less active or even passive in struggling to obtain their interests politically 
and they do not have the capacity to organise themselves for their own 
political purposes. 
To understand civil society in Indonesia from this point of view the 
discussion in the following section will follow the logic of the relationships 
as indicated in the matrix.
The First Forms of State-Civil Society Relations: 
Alternative governmentality
The fi rst pattern of power relations between state and civil society 
in Indonesia is that of alternative/counter/resistance/confl ict. This 
type of power relation is formed when state tactics of governmentality 
are ineffective, and when civil society is strong. The reasons behind the 
ineffective state tactics of governmentality can be identifi ed as limited 
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state intervention in the public life because of several reasons such as 
the absence of a particular state policy  as in Manurung (2007), Kusnadi 
(2007), Dewayanti & Chotim (2004) and ineffi cient bureaucracy, corruption, 
collusion, nepotism as seen in Nasir’s et.al. (2007) research fi ndings. 
An initial example is when Sujuthi (2001), Siregar (2004), and 
Ishak (2004) fi nd that the non-participative policy does not fulfi ll local 
interests and needs, which then local people tend to resist as policy from 
above. From the existing literature we can see the state’s relative absence 
in the public sphere has created the pathway for several elements of civil 
society to emerge such as NGOs to empower marginalised groups at the 
local level (the poor, women, ethnic minority)through several tactics. For 
example, NGOs provide these groups with assistance for socio-economic 
and political empowerment, including giving them education (Manurung 
2007), political advocacy (Dewayanti & Chotim 2004, Hendarta, 2005), and 
advancement in organisational capability and mobilisation (Makinudin 
2004, Dewayanti & Chotim, 2004, Hendarta 2005). 
The literature shows that the involvement of NGOs has stimulated 
alternative governmentality as Appadurai (2002) notes in his research 
in Mumbai, where local people have their own ability to administer their 
population at the local level. In the Indonesian case, this is obtained by 
creating alternatives based on customary law (Hendarta 2005), producing 
local knowledge to counter external ideas which are not participative (Baso 
2002, Sinaga 2004), forming local state tactics of governance (Hendarta, 
2005), and building community-based programs for self help because 
social welfare from the state is ineffective (Dewayanti & Chotim, 2004; 
Makinudin 2004, Kusnadi 2007).
A similar case of alternative governmentality to that explained 
above, has emerged in Bali in the form of coexistence. One example is 
that which is found in the action called gabeng. The coexistence pattern 
has emerged due to the presence of two groups in the villages, i.e. those 
who are critical of and those who are in favor of the presence of investors 
(Dwipayana 2005:40). 
The act of the customs in the village, once intended as institutions 
which guarantees the public good, public interest, and public properties, 
had undergone some transformation due to the temptation of capital 
accumulation introduced by the investors. This has caused some villages’ 
offi cials to come up with the idea of renting customary land or even selling 
it to the investors. 
To some extent there is also confl ict emerging among the village 
inhabitants, especially when they use customary law as an instrument 
for strengthening their bargaining position against the government, the 
investors, and the migrant workers (Dwipayana 2005:40). In this case 
they make use of customary law for formulating their demands, such as 
gaining employment for local people within the territory of the customary 
administrative system (banjar) to work in hotels, preventing the entry of 
migrant workers, or even rejecting the presence of investors (Dwipayana 
2005:41). 
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Several power relations that exist between the state and civil 
society in different parts of Indonesia show characteristics of alternative 
governmentality rather than resistance or coexistance. This type of power 
relation is evident in several cases, such as education advocacy initiated 
by Butet Manurung amongst a marginal community in Bukit Dua Belas, 
Jambi (Manurung 2007); empowerment programme for marginalised 
woman conducted by ASPPUK (Asosiasi Pendamping Perempuan Usaha 
Kecil, the Women Association for Small Scale Business Assistance) 
(Dewayanti & Chotim 2004); the Dayak Meratus community in South 
Kalimantan who refuses to embrace state-sponsored religion and, rather, 
create local myths to justify their existence (Baso 2002); the Simalungun 
Christian community struggling to create their own alternative church 
separated from the colonial tradition. 
Moreover, the revitalisation of autonomous local government 
institutions in “Binua” and the re-enactment of Dayak’s customary law 
in Landak West Borneo, show that a self-governing Dayak community is 
emerging to prevent further exploitation over the customary land by the 
investors (Hendarta, 2005). 
An interesting case that has the characteristic of promoting 
alternative governmentality is the empowerment programme for 
marginalised women. ASPPUK’s empowerment program highlighted 
structural problems causing marginalisation of women and small 
enterprises. ASPPUK’s research conclude that small enterprises run by 
women could not advance because of marginalisation and exploitation 
orchestrated by the state. Marginalisation occurred because the 
government’s development programme did not include villagers as its 
subjects. The ASPUK’s programme took two types of small enterprises in 
two villages in Java, fi rstly the coconut sugar industries in the Banyumas 
regency and secondly, the roof tile home industries in the Klaten regency. 
I these enterprises ASPPUK found that women and their problems 
cannot be separated from the discourse of women and development. 
This is because cultural as well as structural problems are at the root 
of public policy which inhibit women from fully participating in decision 
making processes (Dewayanti & Chotim 2004: 126). Because of this, the 
government’s policy did not support small village enterprises which mostly 
involve women. 
However, the state policy favourably supported big and middle 
scale enterprises through fi nancial support, despite the better performance 
demonstrated by small enterprises. This shows that the state does not 
consider the potential, the aspirations and the rights of women in accessing 
productive resources. Consequently, women are marginalised and forced 
to seek informal sources of capital, such as from moneylenders and loan 
sharks (Dewayani & Chotim 2004:12-3). 
The existence of informal sources of capital makes the condition of 
women’s home industries even worse. This is because moneylenders and big 
traders control economic resources, product marketing and distribution. 
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Women in home industries in this situation are borrowing money from 
the lender who then has the right to sell their product or they must buy 
raw materials from the money lender or big business. Unwittingly, women 
enter into a trap of unequal power relations with market (Dewayani & 
Chotim 2004:83). 
This shows that the state tactic of governmentality is ineffective 
because the state is hindered by the state apparatuses’ vested interest. 
To avoid this situation ASPUK created a self-help group for women which 
assists them to avoid loan sharks. This is a good example of a alternative 
governmentality.
Another example of the character of state-society relationships 
is counter-governmentality emerging in a group of young people who 
encourage the local community to take a critical stance in response to 
social problems. This group fi nally chose media as a means to foster social 
change in their village. 
This is apparent in the case of the “Angkringan” bulletin published 
for the fi rst time in January 2000. The Angkringan community used a 
bulletin format to make it simple, accessible and cheap. This bulletin  was 
designed to be a forum for villagers to express their ideas, suggestions, 
and criticisms about social problems around them. The villagers are 
enthusiastic about this community media that enables them to get 
information regarding their neighbourhood. This media constructs a kind 
of consciousness that information is important and functions as a political 
channel.
The “Angkringan” radio is the second instrument that empowers 
villagers alongside the bulletin, because most of Timbulharjo villagers 
are illiterate, especially the elderly. One of the radio’s popular programs 
is “Obrolan Angkringan” (Angkringan Talk). This program raises current 
social issues that attract villagers’ attention, such as education, agriculture, 
security and politics. This program is useful for fi nding solutions to the 
social problems they face. The talk show gives villagers the opportunity to 
involve themselves in this program in which they have an ability to fi nd a 
solution.
This talk show has had a political impact and infl uenced some 
changes in village policies, such as correcting the misappropriation of 
the Fund for Alleviating Urban Poverty (FRUP), exposing the stagnancy 
of the Peasant Working Credits (PWC), encouraging accuracy in the Fuel 
Compensation Fund (FCF) and in observing the local election. In the Fund 
for Relieving Urban Poverty (FRUP) case, the program operator apparently 
colluded with the local cooperatives (koperasi) operator by lending the fund 
to villagers with a higher interest rate. Consequently, the poor, who should 
gain access to easy credit, could not get any benefi t from this program. 
The Angkringan’s confrontational tactic is shown in its bulletin and radio, 
according to Nasir (2007, p.60), this is effective for giving shock therapy to 
the corrupt local state apparatuses and, at the same time, encouraging the 
members of the community to act critically and develop their ability as a 
local government watchdog.
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Community media also has several other advantages (Nasir et. 
al. 2007:23-5). First, community media brings information that is useful 
for the community when observing the implementation of government 
projects in their neighbourhood. The availability of information increases 
the community’s capability to solve their problems. Second, community 
media are able to gather information from community members which can 
then be used by government for formulating development policies. Hence, 
accurate policies can reduce the emergence of misappropriation of funds, 
community discontent and social confl ict at the local level. 
Grassroots political practices as discussed above can be categorised 
as counter/alternative/coexistence-governmentalities since they place 
themselves on the opposite side to the local government. Moreover, 
their critical attitudes as well as their criticism of local bureaucracy’s 
misappropriation of funds, corruption and collusion can be added as 
another reason to put them into this category. Furthermore, NGOs in 
this case play an infl uential role in encouraging community members to 
become more active in participation and critical analysis, as well as to 
have the ability to observe local governance practices but that do not yet 
promote a form of engagement.
The Second Form of State-Civil Society Relations: 
Extralegal governmentality
The second pattern of power relations between the state and civil 
society in Indonesia is manifest in a form of anarchy. This type of power 
relation is formed when both state and civil society forms of governmentality 
are ineffective. 
The reasons behind the state’s ineffective governmentality can be 
identifi ed as limited state intervention in public programs due to several 
reasons, such as the absence of a particular state’s public and social policy 
and ineffi cient bureaucracy. The state’s relative absence in the public 
community has allowed violent elements to play a role in it. Brown and Ian 
Willson (2007) note that the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime has 
resulted in a fragmentation of its patronage networks. This has prompted 
a decline in state-sponsored violence but at the same time the number of 
non-state groups employing violence and intimidation as a political, social, 
and economic strategy has increased in many ways. These violent pressure 
groups have appeared in many spaces of life, using the identity of a certain 
ethnic group, religion, political party or social group. This is the residue 
of the New Order regime which tended to groom groups of thugs to be 
“the clean up machines” in order to ensure the smooth implementation 
of a number of elites’ cum state’s projects. Any state violence conducted 
to muffl e democratic voices from the grassroots, included ethnic violence. 
(Brown and Wilson 2007). 
Brown and Wilson (2007) note that civil ‘bosses’ produce this 
machinery of violence parallel with the implementation of district autonomy. 
This machinery has become a ‘moneymaker’ which enables the ‘bosses’ to 
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‘play’ their violent ‘business’ as guardians of gambling business in Jakarta 
or as militia of political party. 
This phenomenon is not new, paramilitary, vigilante, and militia 
groups have a long history in Indonesia. For instance, the guerillas that 
fought against the colonial army were originally formed from such groups. 
This points to the long-standing historical ambiguity between “legitimate” 
and “illegitimate” violence. In fact, whether in historical times or in very 
recent ones, the thugs are quite often acting as “assistants” to the military 
or police by employing methods of physical and psychological intimidation 
as a means for holding effective power in society. (Brown and Wilson 2007) 
More than that, the symbiotic relationship also exists between 
street-level preman (thugs) and the military and the political elites. 
Through this relationship, preman have the privilege of carrying out their 
own activities as guardians, e.g., control over specifi c sectors of the local 
economy (usually gambling, prostitution and other black market activities), 
in return for bribery of the state offi cials, allowing the thugs to have direct 
channels to almost all level of police or military. Violence, criminality and 
military or police backing are normal and common practice for gaining 
additonal income. Violent gangs and local ‘strong men’, known under a 
variety of names such as jago, jawara, bajingan and more recently preman, 
are the product of a widespread culture that emphasises masculinity, 
martial arts, and superstitious powers. (Brown and Wilson 2007) 
They have been central yet ambiguous fi gures throughout the 
history of the archipelago from the colonial period, such as the legend 
of Pitung in Batavia, to the present. Pitung is considered to be a cultural 
icon of Batavian opposition during the colonial time. The history of Pitung 
remains in the memory of local people and his struggle has inspired the 
emergence of pressure groups in Banten. Today, the legend of Pitung’has 
been transformed into hundreds of preman groups ready to provide safety 
and security services for the business sector. One amongst many is FBR 
(Forum Betawi Rempug, The Betawi Brotherhood Forum) which literally 
occupies Mega Kuningan Central Business District. The FBR denies the 
allegation that they are street thugs, and assert the purity of the Betawi 
culture in contrast to the corruption of the wider society (Brown and Wilson 
2007).
FBR, along with FPI (Front Pembela Islam, The Islamic Defenders 
Front), have emerged as a consequence of the fragmentation of post-
1998 state power. They have constructed Betawi and Islamic identities by 
employing cultural symbols and mythology associated with the cultural 
hero of Pitung. He is depicted as the quintessential jawara (martial art 
champion), both an outlaw and a fi gure of respect and infl uence amongst 
the community, a kind of locally-made Robin Hood. FBR claims to represent 
working-class members of the indigenous Betawi ethnic group of Jakarta. 
It combines appeals to ethnicity and class with a strategy of extortion and 
coercion. 
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Sidel (2007) advances the argument that religious violence in 
Indonesia belongs to a particular narrow period (2000-2004), and as the 
product of distinct political and social developments in the country. He 
argues convincingly that the cases of religious violence were the result of 
a reversal of political fortunes amongst the advocates of Islam after 1999, 
rather than a rise of Islamicism in mainstream Indonesian politics. He also 
points out that religious violence usually occured with direct support from 
members of the Indonesian military. This support had different motives, 
ranging from sympathy with the Islamists to attempts to undermine the 
country’s political leadership, to internal factional disputes and rivalry 
with the Police. 
Cases of vigilanteism are found in Madura as noted by Masaaki 
and Rozaki (2007). In the regencies of Sampang, Bangkalan, Sumenep 
and Pamekasan, the administration is dominated by various such groups, 
including sucthe kiai (the Islamic teacher), the army, or even kiai-Blater. 
Blater is a kind of thug fi gure who is respected in Madurese society because 
in Blater’s hand, the authority can be decided.
Suryawan (2007) in his notes reports that a similar case exists in 
Bali, where there is pressure group called pecalang (traditional militia). To 
some extent, the existence of pecalang has become a competitor for police 
or private security guard. They have their own territory based on the adat 
law. This kind of militia is very potential for confl ict, especially when it is 
used for political purposes.
Political parties are not immune from the use of violence, 
employing party-affi liated security task force or satgas (militia) prepared 
which are organised to employ coercion. During the 1980s, these groups 
were associated with the state-sanctioned parties, the Golkar (Golongan 
Karya = Functional Group) party, PPP (the Islamic-oriented United 
Development Party) and the PDI (the Indonesian Democratic Party); 
there was also the the Pemuda Pancasila (The youngsters of Pancasila) 
as the youth wing supporter of Golkar.  The satgas competition began in 
1999 with the reintroduction of the multiparty system. This function for 
internal party security, such as protecting party assets and controlling the 
membership. However, the satgas have also engaged as private mercenary 
armies, intimidating opponents and critics both within and outside the 
party, providing bodyguards for the private sectors and operating their 
own protection rackets alongside other criminal activities or backing 
up gambling business, smuggling and prostitution (Brown and Wilson 
2007). Furthermore Brown and Wilsons argue that reformasi implied the 
liberalisation of both party politics and underworld criminal activities. The 
satgas have been the most astute benefi ciaries of both processes. For the 
major parties, the satgas are little more than private armies. The internal 
structure of satgas units replicates military orders of hierarchy from the 
regional commander down to the platoon. (Brown and Wilson 2007) 
The extralegal governmentality discussed above shows that the 
state tactics of governmentality have failed to provide legal, social, and 
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political protection of its citizens. This ‘responsibility’ has been taken 
over by the thugs with extralegal methods. Indeed this has become very 
counterproductive for the equal political relation between state and civil 
society. The emergence of the extralegal form in civil society through the 
third party has partially been normalised in everyday life practice, because 
people cannot rely on the police to protect themselves. To some extent, 
the police and military even gain side incomes by backing up the militia 
groups’ protection of prostitution and gambling bussineses (Mundayat, 
2005; Brown and Willson, 2007).
The Third Form of State-Civil Society Relations: 
Patronage governmentality
Patronage governmentality emerges in the situation where the 
power relations between state tactics of governmentality are effective 
but when civil society is weak. There are many forms of patronage 
governmentality. The most well know ones relate to patron-client relations 
and the co-option of people into various dominating governance agencies. 
However, we may also include more paternalistic forms of top-down state 
patronage. The latter situation characterises power relations between state 
and civil society in the Jembrana Regency, Bali. An illustrative case is the 
eradication of corruption and the optimal utilisation of the Government 
Budget for improving people’s prosperity (TIFA, 2005). The local government 
of Jembrana have implemented their program by eradicating the most 
infamous problem in Indonesian bureaucracy: corruption amongst public 
offi cials. Moreover, the local government has tried to utilise their budget 
for developing and improving the standard of living of the local community. 
The fundamental change in the government administration 
system of jembrana has been in developing fi nancial effi ciency in order 
to provide better public services. The Bupati (district head) started it 
by making priority of programs expected to raise the prosperity of the 
populace. The efforts have focused on providing basic human needs in 
three sectors: education, health and economy. In the education sector, the 
local government of Jembrana has tried to be effi cient by grouping several 
understaffed elementary schools into one management. 
This strategy allows the district government to save up to 3.3 billion 
Rupiah per year. Meanwhile, the local government also planned to reduce 
the number of drop-out students in their regency. One of the programmes 
is the waiver of tuition fees for students in elementary school (SD), junior 
high school (SMP), senior high school (SMU), and vocational high school 
(SMK). The district government also provides scholarship for students who 
study in private school. The local government was, moreover, able to reduce 
the number of drop-out students in the regency and achieve success in 
implementing the national program of nine years of basic education. 
The local government of Jembrana has also made signifi cant 
reform in the health sector. The health problems faced by people in 
Jembrana are typical to the rest of Indonesia i.e. people experienced 
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diffi culties in accessing public health services, especially in local health 
centres (puskesmas) and hospitals, due to their economic condition. 
In order to solve the problem, the local government of Jembrana made 
a bold breakthrough. They stopped drug and medical subsidies in local 
health centres and hospital and then shifted it to fund health insurance 
premiums for the people, especially the poor. Every Jembrana citizen has 
the right to receive the insurance, with which the poor can access public 
health services around Jembrana free of charge. The local government also 
provides services for the poor families by providing them with free hospital 
services.
In the economic sector, the local government of Jembrana 
provides funds for supporting the local economy. The Bupati prioritises 
the distribution of funds to poor and small-medium enterprises. This fund 
is to boost local economic activities through entrepreneurship credits for 
the local community especially for those who work in the agricultural 
sector. It is important for Jembrana because this district does not rely on 
the tourism sector but rather agriculture. The Bupati has designed the 
Jembrana economy to become the agricultural base for areas of Bali that 
are dependent on tourism.  This is in order that Bali is not dependent 
on rice and other agricultural products from outside Bali. More than 
that the support fund is utilised for stabilising crops prices and boosting 
agricultural productivity. 
The local government of Jembrana has also succeeded in 
lowering the incidence of corruption. At the same time, it has made the 
local bureaucracy effi cient and improved the performance of local public 
servants. 
However, all these efforts have been without active people’s 
participation. By conducting such top-down development under the 
control of the district head and the state apparatus, the local government 
of Jembrana thus practices a form of patronage governmentality. This 
character of governmentality does not even stimulate civil society to be 
more active in participating in development programs. By contrast, the 
local government of Jembrana has managed to involve business people 
in the local development process. In short, the relationship between the 
district head of Jembrana, economic society and elements of civil society 
is a form of the patron-client relationship. The local government mobilises 
the local community in the decision making process in order to obtain 
support for the implementation of local government’s policies.
The Fourth Form of State-Civil Society Relations: 
Engagement or collusion?
The fourth pattern of power relations between state and civil society 
can be referred to as a form of engagement. This type of power relation is 
formed when the state tactics of governmentality are effective and when 
civil society is strong too. Effective state governmentality can be seen from 
the state’s efforts to manage good governance practices, such as assisting 
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local community development, promoting public health services, providing 
cheap or even free education, and offering working credit that promotes 
the local economy through a process of participation. Meanwhile, civil 
society is strong when they participate in every activity of a development 
program. This situation enables a form of engagement between state and 
civil society. This relationship between state and civil society has the 
potential for substantive democratic practices. Both parties work together 
to empower civil society by providing help and assistance. 
Several cases of power relations between state and society point 
however to collusion rather than engagement. This is counterproductive in 
terms of developing a democratic governmentality. The collusion between 
state apparatuses and civil society in this case tend to be elitist, since it 
only favours some top members of both parties as demonstrated by Sujuthi 
(2001) and Dwipayana (2005). Meanwhile, the rest of civil society hardly 
gains any direct advantages from the relationship. In some cases, the civil 
society acts only as an instrument of the local elites for pursuing their 
personal goals (Suryawan 2005). 
A case of collusion that involves government and elements of civil 
society occurred in Bali. It was based on a mutual understanding between 
elements of civil society, i.e. the customary village and the provincial 
government of Bali. The customary villages only acknowledged the puri’s 
(royal family members) authority in cultural matters while the state 
was charged with public affairs. Dwipayana (2005:87) goes even further 
by saying that there has been an ongoing process of sacralisation and 
domination of the state’s authority in Balinese society. The state tended 
to replace the roles once played by the kings in the past. The adat villages 
were even more dependent on the state in solving and handling their 
public affairs. Furthermore, the village was taken advantage of by external 
investors and their government related partners. 
 This has led the customary villages to respond in an accommodative 
way which makes them vulnerable to the practice of collusion. This response 
emerged due to a number of opinions emerging as local rumours. For 
example it was rumoured that investors were able to alleviate the poverty 
problem in their village. This rumour promotes opportunities for locals to 
be involved in collusion with the local government through supporting the 
investors to invest at the local level. (Dwipayana 2005 p.39-40). 
Another incidence of collusion that deserves attention is the 
case of Tarekat Rejoso in Jombang, East Java. This incident portrays 
how collusion took place between the state and civil society, in particular 
the Muslim community. during the New Order regime. The relationship 
between state and the Muslim community during the New Order regime, 
according to Abdul Aziz Thaba (in Sujuthi 2001), can be divided into three 
periods. 
The fi rst is a period where an antagonistic relationship developed 
(1967-1982). This situation occurred when the  aspirations of some 
Muslim leader to participate in political life did not match with the New 
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Order regime’s plan to marginalise political parties and to outlaw ideologies 
outside Pancasila (the state’s offi cial ideology). 
The second period was a period of a critical-reciprocal relationship 
(1982-1985). This relationship developed because of the growing awareness 
by the state and the Muslim community of the need to understand each 
other’s position. 
The third period is refered to as the accommodative relationship 
period (1985-1994). It was established when the Muslim community felt 
confi dent that the New Order regime would not secularise Indonesia by 
implementing the principle of Pancasila. This period was marked by the 
lifting of the ban on veils in public schools, the enactment of National 
Education Law (which included the religious boarding schools pesantren), 
the enactment of the Religious Court Law, etc. 
Muslims enjoyed greater freedom in expressing their religious 
beliefs, as long as it did not contradict the state’s ideology. Within this 
situation, Sujuthi notes that Islamic sect (tarekat) based on pesantren 
(religious boarding school) had a strong relationship with the state during 
the New Order. 
On the one hand, the tarekat occupied a special place in the 
New Order’s politics because of the presence of its charismatic religious 
leader, the Kyai. The Kyai had large capacity for mobilising people, the 
santri (pupils of boarding school), and at the same time, the New Order 
regime wanted to use them to their political advantage during the general 
elections (Sujuthi 200:xx). 
On the other hand, the tarekat was powerless when facing the New 
Order regime. The tarekat did not have enough funds to develop facilities 
for the pesantren due to their social-economic weakness. They had to ask 
the government for help in funding this development (Sujuthi 2001, p.195). 
Many tarekat also sought government help in their dakwah (proselytising). 
This situation promoted collusion between the two parties - one for the 
purpose of pesantren development and the other one is for the political 
purpose of supporting the ruling party.
There were several reasons for Kyai Ramli’s of Tarekat Rejoso to 
join Golkar. First, he wanted to advance his tarekat, his pesantren, and 
his Darul Ulum University. In order to do this, Kyai Ramli believed that 
the government’s support and cooperation was essential, especially in 
providing funds for developing the pesantren’s facilities (Sujuthi 2001, 
p.68). Second, Kyai Ramli had a hidden agenda in joining the Golkar party. 
Of the four big pesantren in Jombang, his pesantren was the only one that 
did not have a fi gure at the national level. Apparently, there was some kind 
of social status jealousy; some weakness and backwardness that need to 
be overcome by Tarekat Rejoso. Third, there were political pressures from 
the government, hindering the tarekat from conducting their mission. 
The New Order regime controlled almost every aspect of social 
life, including much of the religious activities (Sujuthi 2001, p.69). This 
applied to tarekat followers. Many tarekat activities were suspected of being 
State and Civil Society Rela? onships in Indonesia
92
politically oriented and, hence, religious praying became complicated. 
According to Sujuthi (2001, p.76), Kyai Ramli joined Golkar in his personal 
capacity which then assisted his institution in obtaining many benefi ts 
from Kyai Ramli’s position in Golkar. They received aid and facilities from 
the government. Moreover, many high-ranking offi cials from provincial 
government visited Tarekat Rejoso which, according to Sujuthi (2001, 
p.168), refl ected the government’s positive attitude toward them. 
Meanwhile, the participation of Kyai Ramli in Golkar brought 
many advantages to this party. According to Sujuthi (2001:70), Kyai Ramli 
helped Golkar to broaden its infl uence to the santri group and to gain 
support from them. By gaining support from the santri group, Golkar also 
gained political legitimacy among Muslim communities by producing a new 
image as a non-secular party. These advantages made Golkar able to win 
the support of the santri group and secure its domination in the general 
elections. 
This kind of political relationship to a great extent is not a form 
of engagement but rather of collusion in the interest of both parties. Their 
target is to obtain benefi t for their own groups’ interest rather than for 
the society in general. Political pragmatism for organisational gain and 
benefi t is the main purpose in this case rather than promoting democratic 
governmentality and political equality.
Conclusion: In Search of Space for Democratic Government
This paper has shown how the relationship between state and 
civil society in Indonesia is part of the problem of building democratic 
government. The problems in Indonesian society is the polycentric nature, 
by which  civil society organisations or popular organisations are being 
fragmented and often unorganised.  This has made it increasingly diffi cult 
to transform various confl icts into more political through democratic 
institution. At least there are four major problems:
The fi rst problem is when a strong civil society faces an ineffective 
state tactic of governmentality. This tends to stimulate civil society 
resistance and confl ict; or it fosters coexistence through alternative 
governmentality techniques where the relationship between the state and 
society is in confl ict. 
The second problem is when a weak civil society faces an effective 
state. This tends to trigger practices of money politics which are embedded 
in patronage and clientelism. Generally this tendency can be found in 
areas with a strong traditional character. Here the remnants of the New 
Order regime are important within politics and patronage and clientelism 
remains signifi cant within politics. As show in this article, there may also 
be cases of top-down state patronage.
The third problem can be found in the situation where weak civil 
society faces an ineffective state which tends to stimulate the emergence 
of extralegal governmentality practiced by thugs, militia, vigilantes and 
paramilitaries. This leads to a defi cit in the democratic governmentality, 
which is whenpeople with more or less citizen rights internalise and 
practice more equal relations of power.
93
PCD Journal Vol. 1, No. 1 & 2
The fourth problem is refl ected in the situation where a strong 
civil society faces an effective state. Ideally this condition should promote 
engagement between state and civil society. In fact it is hardly evidence. 
What usually happens is an engagement in a form of collusion for their 
benefi t. This collusion happens when civil society view the state as an 
instrument for economic, social, political, and cultural resources negatively, 
while the state apparatus views civil society as an economic resource only. 
This pattern neglects the importance of engagement that will become the 
base for democratic governmentality.  
Endnotes
1  The authors wish to acknowledge with thanks a number of critical and 
constructive comments and proposals from the anonymous reviewers of previous 
draft versions of the article.
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